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THE PROPER FUNCTION OF AN APPELLATE
COURTt
EDSON

R. SUNDERLAND*

One of the most important and interesting of the fields of
legal procedure is that which deals with appellate review. No
part of the law is more deeply incrusted with the relics of
ancient customs and institutions. None has been more completely removed from the influence of lay opinion and consequently none has been more highly technical. It is a field which
abounds in rationalized explanations for unnecessary processes
and useless restrictions, and it is possibly for that reason that
appellate practice is in so chaotic a condition in the United
States. The subject of Appeal and Error occupies more space
in Corpus Juris than any other except Corporations. It is to
certain features of this most intricate and engaging subject
that I want to devote the time that has been alloted to me to-day.

I
There was nothing known to the common law which was, or
could properly be called, a true appeal from one court to another,
and this was so in England until the judicature act of 1873.'
There were, however, certain imperfect and restricted methods
by which some sort of redress could be had for an unjust
decision.
All questions of fact were decided by juries, and a review of
the facts could be had by what was called the attaint. This was
t Read by Professor Sunderland before the Gary Bar Association.
* See p. 517 for biographical note.
1 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2nd. Ed.) 664; I Holdsworth, History of English Law (3rd Ed.) 214.
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the common law predecessor of the new trial, but it took place
before a superior jury of twenty-four who reviewed the action
of the twelve. It was like an appeal from a single judge to a
bench of judges, and involved the idea of a superior grade of
tribunal whose decision would, for that reason, be of higher
quality. But it was primarily a proceeding against the jury
rather than against the verdict. The attainted jury was
punished by imprisonment and fine for its false verdict, although
the false verdict was at the same time, and as a useful incident,
replaced by the true verdict of the higher jury. 2
Questions of law, on the other hand, were decided by the
judges, and a proceeding very much like the attaint was
developed to reach false judgments. In the 1200s complaints
against judgments took the form of semi-criminal proceedings
against the judges, and Holdsworth tells us that even to the
present day the writ of error is deemed to commence a new
suit for no better reason than because, six hundred years ago,
it really was a new proceeding directed against the judge, and
was based upon a new cause of action arising out of the wrongful act committed by him in rendering his false judgment. To
this day, also, we employ formal assignments of error because
six hundred years ago the judge was held to be entitled to
know what were the charges against him, 3 and the assignments
of error are still regarded in many of our states as the appellants pleading in the court of errors, just as they were regarded
six hundred years ago.
But -while the same theory of review applied to both verdicts
and judgments, and the jury, in the one case and the judge in
the other, became defendants before a superior tribunal in a
proceeding very much like an accusation of perjury, it is interesting to observe that the judges nevertheless enjoyed certain
privileges which were denied to the jury. While attainted jurors
were both fined and imprisoned, the judges got off with a fine;
and while the jurors had to stand or fall on the merits of their
verdict, the judges could defend their judgments by means of a
duel. But lest this give too great an advantage to brawny
appellants, and encourage too free a recourse to proceedings in
error, penalties were provided for unsuccessful applicants. The
Assizes of Jerusalem which were typical of the time, required
2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2nd Ed.) 665.
3

1 Holdsworth, History English Law (3rd Ed.) 214.
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the party seeking to falsify the judgment to fight the whole
court, including the judges and the witnesses. 4 Under such
conditions losing parties were inclined to let matters drop, particularly in view of the fact that the county often kept a doughty
champion in its employ to represent the court in such
emergencies.5
It was not until the days of Edward I, who reigned from
1272 to 1307 and in whose reign our present bill of exceptions
was first invented and authorized, that the idea arose of a complaint against a judgment which was not an accusation against
the judge. 6
Now, the interesting thing about the common law proceeding
in error was that it did not operate as a review of the merits of
the judgment. The question never arose as to whether the judgment was just or unjust, nor did the proceeding ever involve
an inquiry as to what the true judgment ought to be. The sole
question was, Did the judge commit an error? Such error
might be great or small, its consequences might be serious or
trifling, but an error was an error and the judgment must fall.
Here again there is a clear survival of the idea of a criminal
accusation against the judge. A civil complaint and criminal
complaint are of a wholly different character. "In civil justice,"
says Salmond, "the complaint amounts to a claim of right; in
criminal justice it amounts merely to an accusation of wrong.
Civil justice is concerned primarily with the plaintiff and his
rights; criminal justice with the defendant and his offences."7
The proceeding in error attacks the false judgment which has
been wrongly rendered; it does not demand or obtain the true
judgment to which the appellant was right entitled.
The accusatory nature of the common law proceeding in error
was not a feature peculiar to England, but was even more strikingly developed in France, where the appellant was required on
the same day, to kill or conquer all the judges who concurred
in the judgment or lose his own head. 8 From the contemporary
existence of this proceeding in both England and France during
the 1200s one might expect to find a similar subsequent development in the two countries, but such was not the case. France
4 Glanville VIII, 9.

2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2nd Ed.) 667.

'.

2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2nd Ed.) 668.

Salmond, Juris. (6th Ed.) 71.
b Brissand: History of French Public Law (Garner's Trans.) 227.
7
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succeeded in throwing off the paralyzing restrictions of this
barbaric procedure, and developed a rational and effective system of true appellate review, but in England the strangle hold
of the common law tradition never relaxed until long after the
American colonies had set up an independent government of
their own, and had taken over, as heirs of the common law, the
medieval theory of a judicial proceeding in error.
II
The real explanation of the persistence with which the scope
of judicial review in common law actions was confined to the
identification of errors, is undoubtedly to be found in the institution of trial by jury.
Prior to the invention of the bill of exceptions, in 1285, no
review could be had except for errors apparent on the face of
the record, and it might therefore be said, with sufficient accuracy, that so far as the knowledge of the reviewing court was permitted to extend, no errors could be deemed to have legal existence except those which appeared on the fact of the record
itself. The problem before the court of errors was in that case
very simple, for if any alleged error was found to exist, the
judgment was merely reversed and the case normally remanded,
and that was the end of the whole controversy in that court.
When, however, bills of exceptions were authorized, a wholly
new problem arose. The errors brought up by that device did
not immediately control the judgment, as did the errors in the
judgment roll, but only affected the minds of the jury. But the
extent and character of that influence could not be shown to
the reviewing court. They could tell if any error had been made
in admitting or excluding evidence, or in any other matter
involved in the trial before the jury, but they could not tell what
effect it had upon the verdict. In such a situation there was
nothing to do -but send the case back for a new trial, go that
another verdict could be obtained free from the error which had
vitiated the first one.
The remand of cases for new trials was therefore a necessary
incident in the use of juries. So long as the jury had the exclusive right to weigh the evidence and find the facts, no error
which was related in any material respect to either of those
functions could be cured in any other way. The judges of the
higher court could not undertake to adjust the verdict so as to
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eliminate the error, without depriving the parties of their right
to trial by jury.
But in spite of the use of new trials, there was one part of
the case which could never be reviewed at all, and that was the
part which dealt with questions of fact. The very essence of a
proceeding in error involved the conception of wrong judicial
conduct on the part of the judge. He had no control over the
conclusions which the jury might draw from the evidence, and
if they went wrong it was sufficient to say that it was no fault
of his. Therefore no error could be assigned upon any matter
of fact.
Summarizing the scope of this common law system of review,
it may be said that it deals best with the least important class
of questions, namely, controlling errors of law which appear
upon the judgment roll, that it deals very clumsily and crudely,
by means of new trials, with those incidental errors of law which
affect the course of the trial and influence the conduct of the
jury; and that it deals not at all with pure errors of fact.
The utter inadequacy of such a proceeding as a means of
relief against unjust judgments, might possibly have reacted
unfavorably upon the institution of the civil jury, had it not
been for the simultaneous rise of the court of chancery, which
offered remedies where the rigid rules of the common law were
unequal to the task.
Continental Europe had had a very different experience from
that of England. There, both law and fact were determined by
the same persons, and the theory of a divided tribunal, one
part to try the facts and the other to declare the law, had never
become established. Under such a system there was no serious
obstacle to a full review of a judgment by other judges, who
could be as free to reconsider the facts as they were to pass on
the law. This enabled the appellate tribunal to dispose of the
whole controversy, and render the judgment which ought to
have been rendered, and there was no occasion whatever for
ignoring questions of fact or for sending back cases for new
trials. The accusatory character of the primitive proceeding
in errors, which directed attention to the conduct of the judge
rather than to the rights of the parties, and destroyed a wrong
judgment without at the same time substituting a true one, could
not maintain itself in the face of a trial procedure which made
it possible to have a full review of the whole case. Therefore
the proceeding in error died out, and the appeal took its place as
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the almost universal means of reviewing judicial decisions.
The continental notion of a unified tribunal, capable of dealing
at the same time with the law and the facts, was adopted in
England in the courts of chancery, so that in reviewing equity
cases there was no need for resorting to the clumsy and ineffective procedure in error. If the upper court had the power
to determine the merits of the case, it became less important to
know whether an error had been committed than to know how
it could be rectified. In a proceeding in error the entire aim
of the review was to affirm or deny the existence of the error;
in a true appeal that problem became merely preliminary to the
really basic question of what the right decree should be.
Accordingly, there grew up and flourished side by side, in
England, two entirely different methods and theories of review.
One was a relic of the barbaric times of the Plantagenets, which,
sheltered by England's island isolation and fortuitously
grounded upon the institution of the civil jury, long outlived
the stage of civilization which brought it into existence. The
other was a practical mechanism, developed under the stimulus
of the renaissance out of the vast storehouse of the Roman law,
whose sole purpose was to furnish an adequate and convenient
corrective for all the faults of trial courts.
The two methods were bound to influence each other.
On the one hand the obvious superiority of the appeal exerted
a slight tendency to liberalize the manner of dealing with proceedings in error, at least to the extent of permitting new trials
to be had for glaring errors of fact, under the convenient disguise of the familiar fiction that such errors were errors of law.
But so long as the jury had theoretical jurisdiction over questions of fact, there was not much to be hoped for in enlarging
the scope of review in law cases. To grant new trials with
greater readiness was a doubtful benefit to suitors, for it resulted only in destroying a verdict which had cost a great deal
to get, and the parties were back again where they were before
with practically nothing to show for their pains.
On the other hand, the great latitude of the continental appeal
and the freedom with which continental courts re-examined the
case as it existed, rather than merely the case as it was tried,
permitting new evidence to be introduced when it would serve
the ends of justice, 9 set a pace which English judges, trained in
9 Englemann, Hist. of Cont. Civil Proc. (Millar's Trans.) 369, 488, 732.

PROPER FUNCTION OF AN APPELLATE COURT

the technical logic of the common law, were unable to follow.
Consequently the appeal in equity fell just short of becoming a
true rehearing. New questions could not be considered. New
evidence was never admitted in the House of Lords in a chancery
appeal, and if evidence offered below was rejected and therefore
not passed upon by the trial court, the House would not receive
it, but would remit the case to be reheard below.1o
The situation so produced was unsatisfactory in every way.
The equity appeal was not as good as it ought to have been, and
the proceeding in error was much worse than a civilized nation
ought to have been asked to put up with.
We are here dealing with two distinct restrictions on the
scope of the review, one excluding the presentation of new
evidence or of new points not raised below, which applied both
to appeals in equity and to proceedings in error at law; the other
prohibiting the review of facts, which applied only to proceedings in error.
So far as the rules of practice, both at law and in equity,
excluded new evidence or the raising of new points in the appellate court, this was a mere survival of the ancient common law
theory of an accusation against the judge. It was an inherited
tradition and nothing more. It was often defended on the
ground that it would be unfair to the trial judge to reverse his
judgment on a point which had never been brought to his attention. This was based on the medieval theory that the judge
was interested in the review as the real defendant in the accusation of error. It entirely overlooked the immensely greater
interest which the appellant had in obtaining a correct judgment, and it ignored the interest of the state in the just and
effective operation of its courts. The rule was often defended
on the ground that it would be unfair to the appellee to raise
new points against him in the appellate court, but this was
obviously an excuse and not a reason, for the restriction was
administered as an inflexible rule of jurisdiction and not as a
rule of convenience subject to special circumstances.
So far, on the other hand, as the rules of practice in law
cases prohibited the review of matters of fact, and prevented
the adjustment of the judgment on account of errors which
might have affected the opinions of the jury, they rested, not
10 2 Daniell, Chan. Prac. (5th Ed.) 1432.
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on traditional practice merely, but upon the institution of the
civil jury.
In the course of the struggle for procedural reform which the
people of England carried on throughout the nineteenth century,
one of the palliatives which the legal profession offered to the
public was the right to waive a jury in civil cases. In 1853 the
Commissioners for Inquiring into the Practice of the Courts
of Common Law made a report in which they admitted that the
excellence of the jury as a judicial institution had been lately
much questioned, that the experience of the inferior courts in
dispensing with juries had been very successful, and they concluded to recommend that while trial by jury should continue
to be the rule, the parties should be allowed, if they both so
desired, to leave the decision of the issues of fact to the judge.1"
Parliament approved of this recommendation, and the Common Law Procedure Act of 1854,12 for the first time in English
history, made it possible to try a law case in a superior court
without a jury.
This should have opened the way at once for a review of the
facts in law cases tried without a jury, and to the abolition of
the new trial as the normal corrective of errors other than those
apparent upon the face of the judgment roll, but the insidious
power of inherited tradition, which operates so powerfully
through group suggestion on a closely organized profession like
that of the bar, so restricted the effect of the reform that it was
impossible to escape the proceeding in error even when a jury
was waived, for the act provided that the verdict or finding of
the judge should be of the same effect as the verdict of a jury.
This absolutely prevented the use of an appeal in law actions.
No higher court could either review the facts themselves, or
adjust the findings in order to remove the prejudicial effects of
errors committed by the court in the course of the trial, so that
the burdensome consequences of remand for new trial still pursued the unfortunate litigant in spite of his waiver of the jury.
With so little to be gained by substituting a judge for a jury,
the act was seldom availed of, and the profession settled down
once more in its old rut, trying law cases before juries and reviewing them by writs of error, while they tried equity cases
before the judges and reviewed them by appeal.
11Second Report (1853)

pp. 3, 4, 5.

12 17 & 18 Vict., Ch. 125, Sec. 1.
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Twenty years later the Judicature Acts removed forever this
irrational limitation upon the effectiveness of a review in law
actions, and the finding of a judge sitting in such a case without a jury was given no different effect from the decision of a
judge in equity. At the same time the restriction against raising new points in the court of appeal was also removed, and for
the first time Englishmen enjoyed the protection of an appellate
court authorized to use every convenient means for giving litigants the relief to which they were justly entitled.
Under the present English practice all appeals to the court
of appeal are by way of rehearing, and are brought up by notice
-in a summary way, without any petition, case or formal proceeding of any kind. Appeals in equity and at law follow the
same procedure and present identical problems.
The court of appeal is given all the powers and duties as to
amending and otherwise of the trial court, together with full
discretionary power to receive further evidence upon questions
of fact, such evidence to be either by oral examination before
the court or by affidavit or deposition. Such new evidence may
be given as of right and without leave when it relates to any
matters which have happened since the trial, in order that the
court of appeal may be able to render the final judgment or
decree which the trial court would and should have rendered if
it had tried the case on a full showing of the merits as of the
date when it is reheard in the court of appeal.
The court of appeal is expressly given power to draw inferences of fact and to give any judgment and to make any order
which ought to be made, and to make such further or other
order as the case may require. Such powers may be exercised
in favor of all or any of the parties, although such parties may
3
not have appealed from or complained of the decision.'
If, upon hearing an appeal, the court is of opinion that a new
trial ought to be had, it may so order, and the new trial may
be limited to such parties or issues as the court of appeal may
direct.14
But the legal profession found it hard to escape from the
habits of six hundred years. The conception of the scope of a
law appeal as a mere proceeding in error, which permeated the
entire literature of the law and confronted every lawyer in his
13 Order
14 Order

58.
39.
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daily reading, maintained a tenacious hold on the bar and called
forth many explanations and admonitions from the enlightened
and able judges who have ornamented the English appellate
bench in recent times.
In Coghlan v. Cumberland, (1898) 1 Ch. 704, Lord Lindley,
M. R., made the following observations regarding the theory
upon which the court of appeal reviewed questions of fact:
"This action is brought on the ground that the plaintiff was
induced to buy the business by misrepresentation. . . . The
case was not tried with a jury, and the appeal from the judge
is not governed by the rules applicable to new trials after a
trial and verdict by a jury. Even where, as in this case, the
appeal turns on a question of fact, the court of appeal has to
bear in mind that its duty is to rehear the case, and the court
must reconsider the materials before the judge with such other
materials as it may have decided to admit. The court must then
make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed
from, but carefully weighing and considering it, and not shrinking from overruling it if on full consideration the court comes
to the conclusion that the judgment is wrong. When, as often
happens, much turns on the relative credibility of witnesses who
have been examined and cross-examined before the judge, the
court is sensible of the great advantage he has had in seeing
and hearing them. It is often very difficult to estimate correctly the relative credibility of witnesses from written depositions; and when the question arises which witness is to be
believed rather than another, and that question turns on manner and demeanor, the court of appeal always is, and must be,
guided by the impression made on the judge who saw the witnesses. But there may obviously be other circumstances, quite
apart from manner and demeanor, which may show whether a
statement is credible or not; and these circumstances may warrant the court in differing from the judge, even on a question
of fact turning on the credibility of witnesses whom the court
has not seen."
In Rickmann v. Thierry, (1896) 14 R. P. C. 105, Lord Halsbury, with whom concurred Lord Macnaughten and Lord Davey,
said: "But, my Lords, I must add that I am entirely unable to
yield to the argument which has been, not unnaturally, pressed
upon us by counsel. I say not unnaturally, since more than one
of the learned judges have given countenance to it by observations made in the course of their judgments. I mean the argu-
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ment that there is a presumption that we ought not to interfere
with what the judge of first instance has done. I absolutely
refuse to acquiesce in any such argument. The hearing upon
appeal is a rehearing, and I do not think there is any presumption that the judgment in the court below is right. That one's
mind may be, and ought to be, affected so as to lead one to
distrust one's own judgment, if the appeal is from a very able
or learned judge, for whose judgment one may have great respect, is true. .
.
But upon appeal from a judge where both
fact and law are open to appeal, it seems to me that the appellate tribunal is bound to pronounce such judgment as in their
view ought to have been pronounced in the court from which
the appeal proceeds, and that it is not within their competence
to say that they would have given a different judgment if they
had been the judge of first instance, but that because he has
pronounced a different judgment they will adhere to his decision.
. . . For these reasons, I have thought it right to protest
against the motion that when the judge of first instance has
decided a question he has done something which is binding upon
the court of appeal, and that unless they think it very wrong,
according to the language of the learned judges, they must
acquiesce in the judgment."
The House of Lords has very recently deemed it necessary to
repeat and emphasize this doctrine as to the right and duty of
the court of appeal to review questions of fact in cases tried
without a jury. In Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Proctor, (1923) A. C. 253, an action at law for damages was brought
by the widow of a deceased laborer for negligently causing his
death, and the negligence alleged was the failure to properly
fence at the point where he fell into the water and was drowned.
The case was tried by Branson, J., without a jury, and the
court of appeal set aside his judgment. On a further appeal to
the House of Lords, Lord Chancellor Cave said: "It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the finding of Branson,
J., being a finding of a trial judge on a question of fact, should
not have been disturbed by the court of appeal. In my opinion
there is no ground for such a contention. The duty of a court
hearing an appeal from the decision of a judge without a jury
is no longer in doubt. . . . In such a case it is the
duty of the court of appeal to make up its own mind, not disregarding the judgment appealed from and giving special
weight to that judgment in cases where the credibility of wit-
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nesses comes into question, but with full liberty to draw its own
inferences from the facts proved or admitted, and to decide
accordingly."
The emancipation of English judicial administration from
the burdensome limitations of the proceeding in error in law
cases tried without a jury, has resulted in a similar development in the self-governing dominions of the British Empire.
Similar statutes are found in Canada, and the Canadian Supreme
Court, in Annable v. Coventry, (1912) 46 Can. Sup. Ct. 573,
followed the English doctrine in declaring that "It is within
the province of an appellate court and it is its duty, 'even where,
as in this case, the appeal turns upon a question of fact
to rehear the case . . ., not shrinking from overruling it if,
on full consideration, the court comes to the conclusion that
the judgment is wrong.'"
But even in the new world the
medieval common law tradition dies hard, and so recently as
1924, in Douglas v. Peacock, (1924) 4 D. L. R. 1037, 1044, that
court felt called upon to issue a warning to provincial courts of
appeal against giving too much effect to the findings of the trial
judge on matters of fact.
So in Australia, in Dearman v. Dearman, (1908) 7 C. L. R.
549, the high court of that commonwealth said that the English
rule, as stated by Lord Lindley in Coghan v. Cumberland, supra,
had been adopted as a governing authority, and that "any court
of appeal which does not so weigh the matter out for itself, and
assign its relative importance to the advantage possessed by
the primary tribunal would so far abdicate its functions and
deprive the suitor of the right which the law gives him."
III
The United States is the unfortunate heir of the dual system
of error and appeal, as it came down from the Middle Ages.
We have not always kept the old names, but names mean nothing
in themselves. What we call an appeal may be an appeal or it
may be a proceeding in error or it may be both. Statutory
language must be interpreted according to its context. Certain
it is, however, that we have two kinds of review, the limited
review of errors of law and the full review of the merits, and
these two methods, in their essence, are error and appeal.
In the first place, we inherited the accusatory tradition of
the proceeding in error, which prohibited the raising of new
points on review. It has produced some curious situations.
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In the State of New Mexico, not long ago, one Francisco
Garcia and his brother were indicted for murder and both were
found guilty of manslaughter. In its opinion on review, 15 the
Supreme Court of New Mexico says: "A curious fact appears
in this case. Francisco Garcia, one of the defendants, became
engaged in an altercation with the deceased, whereupon deceased shot Garcia and he fell to the floor, and remained there,
unconscious, during the whole of the remainder of the difficulty.
Cipriano Garcia, his brother, was at the time at the back of the
saloon where the difficulty occurred, and took no part in the
same up to that time. Upon hearing the shot and seeing his
brother fall to the floor, he rushed to his rescue, encountered the
deceased and killed him. No proof of concerted action on the
part of the brother is shown. It thus appears that it was
physically impossible for Francisco Garcia to be guilty of any
crime in this connection, and he was entitled to an instruction
to the jury to acquit him. Had the matter been called to the
attention of the court before instructing the jury, no doubt he
would have so directed them. But counsel sat quiet. Nor did
counsel call the attention of the court to this proposition in the
motion for a new trial. Under such circumstances, no relief
can be granted here. No question is here for decision, the court
below never having decided the point. . . . The remedy of
the defendant, Francisco, is an application to the Governor for
pardon. . . . The judgment of the lower court is affirmed,
and it is so ordered."
Now, why should the highest court in the state be unable
to protect a defendant from punishment when the record before
that court shows conclusively, as the court itself admits, that
it is physically impossible for him to be guilty of any crime
whatever? Because we are dealing with the proceeding in error.
Six hundred years ago this proceeding was an accusation against
the judge, and the judge could not be accused of wrong doing
unless he committed an error, and he could not have committed
an error unless he made a ruling. Hence there can be no relief
from an unjust judgment, unless the injustice of that judgment
was due to the erroneous ruling of the judge. If a ruling was
not obtained there is nothing to present to the court of error,
and no matter what outrage may have been committed, the
judgment must stand.
15 State v.

Garcia, 19 N. M. 414.
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It is interesting to observe, however, that, in the case referred to, the court eventually found itself unable to live up to
the traditional definition of a proceeding in error, and upon a
rehearing, which it subsequently granted, it refused to be bound
by that theory where a man's fundamental rights were involved,
asserting the doctrine that a court of last resort must be presumed to have inherent power to protect the innocent in such
cases. Did it therefore discharge this innocent defendant? Not
at all. Although the record before it conclusively proved his
innocence, the common law tradition was still too strong, and
the court could only see its way to order a new trial. It could
get over one hurdle, the want of a formal error or law, to save
a man from prison, but it could not get over the other and save
him from the absurd and useless ordeal of a new trial. It is
hoped that the district attorney was more resourceful.
In the Garcia case the point might have been made below, but
it was not. In the case of Tari v. State of Ohio, (1927) 159
N. E. 594, decided within the last few months, the point was
not made below because it did not have legal existence at the
time, but the failure to make it was equally fatal to the proceeding in error. This was one of the notorious cases in Ohio prosecuted under the statute which provided that the village mayor
or justice should be paid for his services as judge out of the
costs he collected from the defendants whom he convicted. This
statute has been attacked in the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
case of Tumey v. State, (1926) 115 Ohio St. 701, as a denial of
due process, but the court had held that it was valid, and it was
after this decision that Tari was arrested, tried and convicted
under that statute. In view of the decision of the Supreme
Court of Ohio that the statute was valid, no point was made at
the trial against its validity. But after his conviction, the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Ohio, Tumey v. State, (1927) 273 U. S.
510, and unanimously held that the statute was void as a denial
of due process of law. Tari thereupon promptly applied for a
writ of error to reverse his judgment of conviction, but the
Supreme Court of Ohio, although admitting there was no other
remedy, refused it, on the ground that since the point had not
been raised below it could not be availed of in a court of error.
In effect the court said that, even though, under their own decision, the objection had no valid existence at the time of the trial,
nevertheless the failure to raise it when there was in legal effect
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nothing to raise, was a waiver of the point on review. Such an
argument might have been made with equal propriety and success before any English court of errors at any time during the
six hundred years preceding the Judicature Act of 1873. Neither
the justice of the judgment nor the rights of the defendant were
under review. It was a matter of no legal importance whether
or not he remained in jail under a void statute. It was enough
that the point had not been passed upon below. This narrow
conception of the function of a court of review in an action at
law, has frequently been held to have the compulsory sanction
of those constitutions which grant only appellate power to their
highest courts. It is said that such power can be exercised only
as to matters which have already been passed upon, and if new
points were to be considered, that would be the exercise of original jurisdiction.
But the argument begs the question. What, it may be asked,
is being reviewed? The judgment, or the rulings which became
merged in it? Obviously it is the judgment with which the
appellant is dissatisfied, and the correctness of that judgment is
equally under review whether new points or old points are being
considered. The argument confuses appellate power with the
manner of its exercise, and would place upon modern courts a
constitutional restriction against using any data for testing the
justice of a judgment which was not available to courts of error
in the Middle Ages.
If this ancient characteristic of a proceeding in error can
be winked at in desperate cases, to save a man from conviction
for manslaughter, as was done with Garcia, or to reverse judgments based on claims contrary to public policy as is frequently
done, 1 then the doctrine is not jurisdictional at all, but only
customary, and can be made to yield to the demands of justice
as far as either the legislature or the court itself may deem
expedient.
IV
In the second place, we inherited the common law jury, which
carried with it the impossibility of a review of the facts and a
final disposition of the case by the appellate court. Generally
speaking, we were less subservient than the people of England
to the sacred institution, and in at least one jurisdiction, the
colony of Massachusetts, its waiver in civil cases was authorized
16 Crichfield v.

Paving Co., 174 Ill. 466.
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as early as 1641,17 thereby anticipating the reform of the English Common Law Procedure Act by more than two hundred
years; and indeed most of our states had provided for the trial
of law cases by the judges before England did so.
But, as the experience of England showed, the waiver of a
jury is not sufficient in itself to open an avenue of escape from
a review by proceedings in error. It is the exclusive and conclusive character of the verdict which makes a true appeal impossible, and if a finding by the court is merely substituted for
the verdict of the jury, we have done nothing to enlarge our
appellate remedies.
Now American statutes authorizing the waiver of a civil jury
are of two types. One, like the English Common Law Procedure Act, expressly declares that findings shall be made and
shall have the same force and effect as the verdict of a jury.
This was the case with the federal statute, 18 and with those of
a few states, such as New York19 and Kentucky, 20 and in some
instances, as in North Carolina,21 the preservation of this
medieval obstacle to the correction of errors was secured by the
constitution. In the face of such express legislation, the courts
were, of course, quite helpless to effect any radical improvement
in the character of the review, even if they had been so inclined.
But many statutes stopped short of this, and if they provided
at all for findings or conclusions of fact, they did not prescribe
what force and effect they should have.
Here was an opportunity for the profession to take a broad
view of the possibilities of enlarging the usefulness and efficiency
of appellate review. The appeal in equity was perfectly familiar.
The trial judge considered both the facts and the law, and the
whole case went up on appeal for a complete review and a final
decree. Findings of fact, if required in law cases, might serve
very effectively to aid the court on appeal as an analysis of the
evidence, without beinng any more binding than recitals in chancery decrees. There was no historic sanctity in the decision of
the judge upon the facts, as there was in the verdict of a jury,
and no inherent reason, for example, why the judge's views on
the facts in an action at law for damages for the breach of a
17

Body of Liberties, Sec. 29, See Comm. v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 177.

18 Judicial Code, Sec. 649.
19 L. 1847, Sec. 80.
20
21

Code Sec. 332, (1876).
Art, IV, Sec. 13.
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contract, should have any more weight than the views of the
same judge on the same facts when the case was brought in
equity to enforce the performance of the same contract.
But the law tradition was too strong, and the courts, by judicial construction, supplied a limitation which the legislature
failed to incorporate in the statute. The arguments in support
of the conclusive effect of the findings are typical examples of
instinctive opposition to change. Courts had never been required or permitted on appeal to review the facts in law cases,
and they were alarmed by the prospect.
"On principle," said the Supreme Court of Arkansas in an
exhaustive and learned opinion in an early case, "there can be
no more just ground of exception to the finding of the court
upon the evidence, than to the verdict of a jury.

.

.

.

A bill

of exceptions, undertaking to go behind the facts found, by
setting out the evidence, is of necessity unfair, because it conveys to the mind of the appellate court no adequate impression
of the weight of the testimony. If the Supreme Court could
thus be forced to review the determination of facts, we would
not shrink from the duty, however onerous; but we must refuse
to exercise such a jurisdiction, because it is unwarranted by
law, is foreign to the organization of this court, and a dangerous
assumption of power. '2 2 It is difficult to see how the assumption of power to review facts in law cases could be any more
"dangerous" than the exercise of that same power in equity
cases, but expressions of this kind show very clearly a strong
opposition to such an extension of the scope of review.
The United States Supreme Court was for many years embarrassed to know what to do with cases which came up from
federal courts sitting in Louisiana, which were authorized by
act of Congress to follow the local practice. Louisiana used
the civil law, employed no juries, and the cases were taken up
like appeals in equity. It was held that law cases tried in
accordance with Louisiana practice could not be reviewed at all,
because Congress could not constitutionally require the Supreme
Court to review law cases on the facts, and the records as made
up in Louisiana contained no bills of exceptions.23 For that
court to re-examine facts in cases which were legal rather than
equitable, would, it declared, "be dangerous to the trial by jury
24
and at times subversive of the public liberties."
22
23
24

State Bank v. Conway, 13 Ark. 344.
Minor v. Tillotson, 2 How. 392.
Phillips v. Preston, 5 How. 278, 289.
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The public, however, was not universally impressed with the
difficulties and dangers which so seriously alarmed the profession, and, in a considerable number of states, statutes were
passed which expressly authorized a full appeal, on both the
law and the facts, where juries had been waived.
But even here the resources of the profession were summoned
in defense of the familiar doctrine of the proceeding in error.
In Connecticut the legislature passed an act providing that in
any case tried without a jury, any party might appeal from
any finding of facts and the Supreme Court should review all
questions of fact so presented. But the majority of the court
said that it had no constitutional power to review questions of
fact, because it was, by the express language of the Constitution, a "Court of Errors," and the use of this phrase was interpreted to express "the conviction of the people that a jurisdiction of mixed law and fact vested in any court of last resort,
exercising a supreme and uncontrolled power, was inconsistent
with a sound system of jurisprudence and was dangerous to the
'25
administration of justice.
In South Carolina a similar legislative attempt to provide
for the review of facts was met by a similar constitutional argument.26 In Indiana the legislature required the Supreme Court
to go no farther than to determine whether the judgment
appealed from was against the clear weight of the evidence, but
the court said that it was so obviously impossible for an appellate court to decide questions of fact, or even to determine
whether the finding was clearly or overwhelmingly or conclusively against the evidence, that they would not assume that the
legislature intended to put upon them the absurd task of
27
attempting to weigh conflicting oral testimony.
In Wisconsin the legislature, in 1860, undertook to amplify
the scope of review in law actions tried without a jury by
authorizing the same procedure as in equity suits. In the first
review sought under this act, in Snyder v. Wright, (1861) 13
Wis. 689, the distinguished Chief Justice Dixon did not hesitate
to attack the soundness of its legislative policy. Speaking for
the court, he said:
"This is the first case in which we have been asked, under
the provisions of Chapter 264 of the Laws of 1860, to review
25 Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 451.
26
Land Mortgage Co. v. Faulkner, 45 S. C. 503, 506.
27 Hudelson v. Hudelson, 164 Ind. 694.
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questions of fact in a common law action, when the trial below
was had before the court without a jury. The 13th section of
that act provides, that when any issue of fact is tried by the
court, either party, for purposes of an appeal, may, within ten
days after written notice of the entry of judgment, or without
such notice, file with the clerk written exceptions to the facts
found by the judge who tried the cause, or to his conclusions of
law thereon, or both, or to any of them; and may, in case of
appeal or writ of error brought upon the judgment rendered
upon such decision, incorporate such written exceptions into the
bill of exceptions in the case. The 14th section contains similar
regulations as to excepting to facts found in cases tried before
a referee. The 16th section provides, that upon appeals to this
court from judgments in such cases, this court may review any
question of fact as well as of law, decided by the court or referee,
where exceptions have been taken to the findings upon matters
of fact. The method here prescribedfor the settlement of doubtful and disputed questions of fact in actions at law, is certainly
novel and extraordinary. Its wisdom and propriety remain to
be tested, provided the law is to continue upon our statute book.
For ourselves we may say that we doubt them, and were we
permitted to give advice upon the subject, we should counsel its
immediate repeal. The disadvantages of such a mode for the
ascertainment and final determination of facts, in cases where,
for the most part, the witnesses are required to appear and
give their evidence personally before the court or tribunal having original cognizance of the cause, are so obvious that they
will readily suggest themselves to every professional, and even
non-professional person, of ordinary experience and intelligence.
By it the court of last resort is, in a great measure, deprived of
the opportunity of scrutinizing the interest, motives, inclination
and prejudices of the witnesses, their means of obtaining correct
information, and the use they have made of them, their powers
of perceiving facts, the attention which they gave, and their
capacity for remembering and stating them. The opportunity
of observing their manner and deportment, the effect of a crossexamination, and many other circumstances which are often of
quite as much importance in ascertaining the truth as the
answers themselves, are wholly lost. Denied these advantages,
the court is compelled to decide upon the answers alone, and
give its opinion against that of a court possessing them. Will
any one say that such a mode of trying facts is the best and
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most satisfactory, or that it will not unavoidably lead to many
erroneous and unjust conclusions? We think not. It seems to
us that all must concede that such will be the result. Yet, as
we understand the language of the statute-and it is neither
doubtful nor ambiguous--such is the mode which the legislature
meant to establish. In view of these disadvantages, and the
increased and almost intolerable burden which it will impose
upon the members of this court, of examining the details of long
and complicated statements of fact, which are only proper for
the consideration of a court or jury before whom the witnesses
personally appear, we regret that there are no legal or constitutional means by which we can restrict such investigations to
courts of original jurisdiction. As we know of no such means,
we must, however reluctantly, perform the duty thus imposed,
to the best of our ability."
In Oregon the court construed the language of the constitution to be merely permissive as to the review of facts, and it
expressed grave apprehension lest a liberal attitude toward such
reviews would encourage trial courts to disregard their duties
and make mere pro forma decisions, "imposing on the appellate
court the task of deciding questions of fact on mere paper
28
recitals of testimony reported in the record."
Here and there the extention of the power of review over
findings of fact was accepted by the courts and successfully
acted upon.
In Washington, for example, such a statute has been in force
for thirty years, and it seems to be administered on essentially
the same principles as those adopted by the English courts.
Equity actions and law actions are treated exactly alike, and a
finding in either case will be reversed if there is a preponder-

ance of evidence against

it.29

After many years' experience with an appellate procedure
which conformed to the requirements of the common law proceeding in error with the utmost fidelity, the people of California
in 1926 amended their constitution so far as to permit a review
of the facts in cases tried without a jury. It was there provided
that the legislature might grant appellate courts power to make
findings of fact contrary to those found below, with or without
the taking of additional evidence by the appellate court, and to
28 Frederick & Nelson v. Bard, 66 Ore.
29 Rankin v. Blanc, 254 Pac. 254.
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The
make any judgment or order that the case might require.
conformity
in
an
act
passed
promptly
legislature, in 1927,
thereto, directing that the act should be liberally construed with
the purpose of enabling causes to be finally disposed of without
further proceedings in the trial court. 31 It will be interesting
to see how this latest attempt to escape from the proceeding in
error will be dealt with by the courts.
In a considerable number of jurisdictions, the conclusive character of findings in law cases has reacted in a most startling
way upon the practice in equity, causing appeals in chancery
cases to be treated in all respects like common law proceedings
in error, in which the court will under no circumstances, in any
32
case, consider the weight of the evidence.
This, of course, is a reversal of the immemorial theory of
the equity appeal, and abandons all the advantages which English jurisprudence derived from the Roman law of appellate
review as it was employed in continental practice.
On the whole, the United States has not given an impressive
exhibition of ingenuity and openmindedness in dealing with the
opportunities for an enlarged and liberalized system of review
produced by the waiver of juries, nor even of ability to make
full use of the enlightened theory of an equity appeal.
The explanation of this apparent inability to abandon the
common law idea that facts must be exclusively determined in
the trial court and that cases must be remanded for new trials
as the sole means of correcting errors inhering in such determination, is probably to be found in the power of group suggestion, which played so great a part in retarding the reform of
English procedure in the nineteenth century. The professional
mind had become so accustomed to a record in law cases which
contained the separate, formal, and conclusive judgment of the
triers of facts, that not only was it found difficult to imagine
a practice which did not include it, but even the lack of a similar
element in equity cases was sometimes looked upon as a detriment rather than a benefit.
Mr. Trotter, in his interesting book on Instincts of the Herd,
has pointed out that among people belonging to the same social

30 Art.

VI, Sec. 4N.

1927, Ch. 352.
v. Butler, 95 Cal. 206, 213; Lake Erie etc. R. R. Co. v. Griffin,
107 Ind. 464; Wagener v. Kirven, 47 S. C. 347, 352.
31 Stat.
32 Reay
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group, certain conceptions tend to acquire the quality of instinctive truth, because of the accumulated suggestions to which
they have been exposed, and elaborately rationalized explanations are ingeniously devised for their justification, even in the
face of quite obvious evidence to the contrary. 33 Mr. Martin,
writing on "Behavior of Crowds," says that "a crowd is essentially a psychological phenomenon, people behaving differently
in a crowd from the way they behave when isolated." "Any
class may behave and think as a crowd-in fact it usually does
so in so far as its class interest is concerned." Crowd ideas, he
says, are platitudinous. "They possess finality and universality.
They are fixed. They do not develop. They are ends in them'34
selves. Every crowd has its peculiar illusions.
The literature of the law is full of professional illusions as
to the usefulness or the necessity of various rules of procedure
which have come down to us from the past, and nowhere is the
platitudinous wisdom of group psychology expressed with more
finality than in connection with the problems of appellate review. It is a habit of mind which keeps lawyers satisfied with
current methods of practice long after the public has ceased to
have any confidence in their efficiency. This trait has often
been identified and recognized by the public in dealing with the
legal profession. When the English struggle for reform was at
its height in 1850, the London Times said in a leading editorial:
"If the minds of legal men are to be forever perversely directed
to the past, if they will not divest themselves of old prejudices,
and accept new views and ideas suited to the exigencies of the
present times, the public must be content with the attempts
made by laymen to improve a system which cannot longer be
permitted to remain in its old and mischievous condition. The
law and its administration constitute the crying evil of the day.
The patience of society is at length exhausted and des-'
perate remedies will be attempted in the hope of getting rid of
the burden, if well-considered aind rational plans are not proposed by those who have made the science of law and that of
35
legislation the subject of their special -study."
It would probably not be an exaggeration to say that the
United States as a whole has the least efficient system of judicial
Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, 38, 39.
17, 31.
35 London Times, Dec. 24, 1850.
33

34 pp. 16,

PROPER FUNCTION OF AN APPELLATE COURT

review to be found among civilized people in the world today.
The English system of reviewing law and facts, and thereby
enabling appellate courts to render the maximum service to
litigating parties, which has spread over the English speaking
portions of the empire, has been already discussed. The nations
of continental Europe have never restricted the full review of
law and facts which was characteristic of the Roman law, and
they have always maintained a system of appeals competent to
render final and complete justice. And their facilities for adequate appellate review have always been far superior to anything found even in modern England. In France, Belgium,
Austria and Germany, the trial is not only held before a bench
of three judges, but there is a full and unrestricted review of
the whole case on the law and the facts, with the possibility of
raising new points and introducing new evidence, before an
36
appellate court of five judges.
With the rest of the world committed to an adequate theory
and an efficient practice of appellate review, the position of the
United States is something like that of the rookie who complained that all the rest of the company were out of step. It
is hard for the people accustomed to the extraordinary efficiency
of modern industry and to the scientific attitude of the other
professions, to understand why the bar cannot do better than
it does.
If an adequate method of review will entail upon appellate
courts more labor than they are equipped to do, then we must
strengthen, enlarge or supplement those courts. The extent of
the service to be rendered by the judicial department of the
government should hardly be limited to the measure of the
physical endurance of a single group of men. The English court
of appeal sits in as many divisions as the amount of business
requires, and experiences no difficulty in keeping its various
divisions in harmonious and consistent cooperation. If the
proper review of facts requires new and better methods of preparing or presenting the evidence to appellate courts, such, for
example, as the English method of placing less emphasis upon
briefs and allowing a fuller opportunity for the oral argument
and for an immediate consideration and decision by the court
upon the close of such argument, while everything is fresh in
the minds of the judges, we should devote our attention to the
34 See Engleman's Hist. of Cont. Proc. (Millar's Trans.)
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task. Certainly for the bench and bar to meet the public demand
for more service with the argument that the present facilities
are operating to capacity, without making every effort to improve the efficiency of our methods or to enlarge our plant equipment, is a confession of the bankruptcy of the profession as a
social force.

